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IntroductIon
I am delighted to introduce this special issue of the Durham Middle East 
Papers with papers presented at the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic 
Studies (IMEIS) Annual Postgraduate Conference, held at Durham Castle on 
September 20th, 2017.
The IMEIS is a Social Science-focused academic institute of excellence within 
the School of Government & International Affairs of Durham University. It 
is a research-led in ethos, with a track-record of internationally acclaimed 
research outputs across all sub-areas 
of its activity. The interdisciplinary 
nature of the Institute’s activities 
and the interaction of political 
economists, political scientists, 
historians and Islamicists - as well as 
with colleagues from Anthropology, 
Arabic, Archaeology, Geography, 
Business – mark its success through 
collective focus on the study of the 
Middle East and the Muslim world in 
the widest sense.
For its 2017 Annual Conference, the 
IMEIS has gathered young researchers 
around the theme of ‘Diversity’. Throughout time, the Muslim world has been 
diverse ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously. Nonetheless, it 
is still subject to debate whether such diversity has been a weakening factor 
or the reason for Muslim World long-lasting history. Moreover, grasping the 
entirety of this multifaceted nature exceeds by far the boundaries of academic 
disciplines. Thus, the IMEIS suggested exploring diversity not only as a topic 
but also as an approach to Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, and as a 
methodology to carry out research across and between multiplicities of fields. 
“For its 2017 Annual 
Conference, the 
IMEIS has gathered 
young researchers 
around the theme 
of ‘Diversity’.”
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The IMEIS 2017 Annual 
Conference welcomed nine 
speakers who represented 
several institutions across 
the Australia, Italy, Pakistan, 
and the United Kingdom. 
The subjects covered from 
the definition of ‘moderate’ 
Islam, Islamic feminism, the 
interpretation of the Mahdi 
state, the life of Palestinian 
traveller Ya’qub ash-Shelabi, 
the role of the Alawites in the 
Syrian civil war, the state of 
Kurdish literature, and the 
discourse surrounding the 
January 2011 revolution in 
Egypt. 
This special issue of the Durham Middle East Papers has been sought as a 
glance at the IMEIS Annual Conference. It features the Opening Remarks 
by keynote speaker Dr Ipek Demir from Leicester University about the issue 
of diversity concerning knowledge production and decoloniality of this 
knowledge. This was followed by Matthew Hedges’s study of the role of the 
Circassian and Chechen minorities in the security regime of King Hussein 
of Jordan. Finally, Umair Jamal explored how Pakistan’s ‘Blasphemy law’ 
undermines the countries’ religious diversity. I hope the readers of this special 
issue find it informative and enjoyable read and foster their interest in the 
Islamic World and in the activities of the IMEIS. 
Finally, I wish to thank all speakers and participants at the IMEIS Annual 
Conference 2017 for their engagement and enthusiasm. A special thanks goes 
to the authors for their contributions to this special issue. I also would like to 
express my sincere gratitude to the Durham Middle East Papers publishing 
board, especially to Anoush Ehteshami, Clive Jones and Carly Beckerman, for 
the time and effort in ensuring the quality of this issue. 
“Throughout 
time, the Muslim 
world has been 
diverse ethnically, 
linguistically, 
culturally and 
religiously...”
by Juline Beaujouan-Marliere
© Ipek Demir and Durham University, 2018
researchIng the MIddle east: dIversIty or 
decolonIalIty?
Durham Middle East Papers
Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
Ipek Demir
Biography 
Ipek Demir
Dr Ipek Demir is Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Leicester. Her 
work sits at the intersections of the fields of diaspora studies, ethno-politics, 
race and identity, nationalism, indigeneity, global politics as well as social 
and critical thought and interdisciplinarity. She has also carried out empirical 
research on Kurdish and Turkish diasporas, funded by an AHRC fellowship. 
She is the founder and co-coordinator of the British Sociological Association’s 
Diaspora, Migration and Transnationalism Study Group and the former Vice-
Chair of European Sociological Association’s Migration Research Network. 
Before joining Leicester she was an ESRC research fellow at the University of 
Cambridge, and also taught sociology and politics at the Open University, the 
Universities of Sussex and Cambridge. id34@leicester.ac.uk
9
superior. The lack of a critical 
perspective not only shapes what 
white Europeans learn and think, 
but also produces a ‘white gaze’8 
which comes to shape how people of 
colour think about themselves and 
history and vis-à-vis others. Any 
serious understanding of history, 
politics and arts and culture today 
has to unpack and circumvent the 
reproduction of such inherited 
prejudices and hierarchies. This is 
what the current decolonization 
struggle is about, and if it has 
not arrived at your university or 
discipline yet, be prepared, it is 
around the corner. 
Scholars who demand this are at 
times approached with suspicion, 
belittled for having an axe to grind. 
Universities, and the disciplines 
and knowledges created therein 
are seen as somewhat different 
to other institutions. Academia is 
treated as an exception in that the 
best materials, books and ideas 
are apparently taught by the best 
and brightest. Similar arguments 
were of course offered in the 1960s 
and 1970s when academia was 
confronted by feminist critique. 
Decades later, there have been 
major transformations of the 
curricula in the light of feminist 
critique – albeit this is far from 
complete nor is it at a desirable 
level. Disciplines in humanities 
and social sciences have had to pay 
increasing attention to gender, not 
just in terms of subject matter but 
also in terms of epistemological 
11
“...there have 
been major 
transformations 
of the curricula 
in the light 
of feminist 
critique...”
Those opening remarks focus on 
diversity with regard to knowledge 
production, especially in relation to 
Eurocentricism and the associated 
arguments about decoloniality in 
knowledge production.1 
Eurocentricism in knowledge 
production arises from history. The 
modern world is largely shaped by 
European colonialism and empires. 
Modern education systems, the 
curriculum, and the disciplines have 
canons which are shaped by this 
particular history. Colonialism had 
at its core a set of political, economic 
and sociocultural hierarchies.
It also constructed intellectual 
hierarchies which were significant in 
justifying slavery, appropriation and 
exploitation. Such racial hierarchies 
formed through colonialism and 
empires are still reproduced in how 
we see and approach the world, how 
we construct or ignore the thought 
systems of others, including in the 
field of Middle East Studies. There are 
erasures, epistemic violence and also 
an unwritten ‘ignorance contract’ 
shaping what we know, how we know, 
and what we do not know. The field 
of the Global South has aimed to 
challenge this, and has sought to 
shift the way we discuss and theorize 
modernity, globalization, and social 
justice. It draws from a variety of 
sources and approaches, for example 
critical race theory, transnational 
feminism, postcolonialism and 
decoloniality. Within this field, 
the epistemological interventions 
of, for example, Mignolo2 and 
Boaventure de Sousa3 have revealed 
the epistemic violence on others, 
Shilliam4 has examined anticolonial 
struggles, whilst Bhambra5 and 
Chakrabarty6 have criticized the 
inadequate understandings of 
European history and how it impacts 
our understanding of today. The 
focus has been on the gendered, 
racialized, socio-economic and 
epistemological inequalities. Below, 
I discuss why we need decoloniality 
of knowledge production in general, 
and decoloniality in the Middle East 
scholarship in particular. This is 
because ‘[w]e are at a point in our 
work when we can no longer ignore 
the empires and the imperial context 
in our studies’.7
Decoloniality is primarily an 
intervention in epistemology. It 
questions the one-sided and partial 
view of the world, deems it inadequate 
in its understanding of history and of 
today. In an attempt to undo these, 
there is also a growing movement 
seeking to decolonize the curricula 
and canons in disciplines across the 
social sciences and humanities, for 
example in disciplines such as history, 
international relations, sociology, 
literature and social work. Comprised 
of students, academics and activists, 
its proponents argue that through a 
narrow focus on European authors, 
histories and perspectives, existing 
canons and curricula reproduce a 
world-view where Europeans and 
whiteness are seen not only as 
morally but also as intellectually 
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and modernities, diversifying and 
multiplying our understanding of 
modernity and progress. European/
Western modernity was presented 
as one model among many other 
possible different routes, for example 
different to the ones Turkey, Russia 
or China followed 1112 . The multiple 
modernities paradigm, however did 
not do away with Eurocentricism. 
In fact, as has been challenged by 
Bhambra13, the literature on multiple 
modernities in fact does not address 
the problematic constructions of 
modernity or the way in which such 
reconstructions are continuing 
to have consequences for our 
understanding of the present. It fails to 
see modernity as product of complex 
engagements between different parts 
of the world, including Europe and 
elsewhere, and thus as a collective 
good, belonging to humanity. The 
literature on multiple modernities 
sees the rest of the world as external 
to the ‘Miracle that is Europe’. As 
a consequence, when it examines 
the Middle East, it does not show 
enough awareness of colonial roots 
and context nor reflect adequately 
on colonization and its consequences 
on what followed in the Middle East 
and in Europe. In a typical fashion to 
International Relations scholarship, it 
considers Europe and the Middle East 
separately, not interconnectedly.14 
It leaves the dominant way in which 
Europe is understood as sacrosanct 
and untouched, and thus produces 
a problematic construction of the 
Middle East, be it Turkey or Iran. In 
summary, it neither acknowledges 
the legacies of colonialism, nor the 
contributions of ‘others’ to modernity 
and to Europe. Europe and the Middle 
East are left to live in different 
worlds. Within such a Eurocentric 
context, for example, it is no wonder 
that the 2011 Arab uprisings were 
wrongly constructed as mainly an 
uprising against the autocratic and 
‘failed’ regimes in those countries. 
The narrative that the protesters 
were contesting the global order and 
also the West was not recognized or 
effectively reported.15 
The second influential approach 
I would like to consider is 
cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism 
is typically conceived as a normative 
stance against nationalism. It 
demands the expansion of the sphere 
of identification and belonging 
beyond national boundaries. 
Cosmopolitanism, through the 
challenge it brought to nationalism 
and state-centric discourses dominant 
in political science, international 
relations and sociology, could perhaps 
lead the path out of Eurocentricism? 
Scholars of cosmopolitanism have 
been successful in terms of providing 
a normative criticism of nationalism, 
and also of naïve universalism, 
something welcome in Middle East 
Studies. The antagonism which some 
scholars of cosmopolitanism adopt 
towards multiculturalism, however, 
is telling. In fact, multiculturalism 
is used as a foil against 
cosmopolitanism by some of the 
leading cosmopolitanism scholars.16 
For example:
tools and stances shifting how we understand and explain the world .9 Having 
gone through that in terms of gender, it is interesting to note the ensuing 
resistance to the demand to decolonize. It is telling that the simple demand 
for enrichment and for accuracy are at times met with hostility and resistance 
within and outside of academia.10 
As with gender, it is of upmost importance, in my view, that we do not demand 
decolonization so that we can provide a ‘diverse’ curriculum. We must demand 
it so that the curriculum is true to history and our present; one which takes 
us away from one-sided and inadequate accounts. Hence it is not plurality of 
knowledges but injustice to knowledge (through convenient omissions) which 
should be the driver, the impetus here. We must challenge epistemological 
biases and ignorance, not create a parallel canon. Our focus should be on 
oppression and injustice not the celebration of difference. We should, I argue, 
demand epistemic justice, not diversity managerialism for the curriculum. 
Here I would like to consider two approaches which were presented, amongst 
others, as alternative perspectives to Eurocentricism: multiple modernities, 
and cosmopolitanism. These two approaches have been extremely influential 
in amongst the disciplines which feed the Middle East Studies scholarship, 
especially disciplines such as international relations, politics, sociology and 
history. In the rest of this paper I would like to discuss the limitations of both 
the multiple modernities paradigm and the cosmopolitanism scholarship 
and argue that neither have the potential to take the rest of the world 
into consideration in a way which would move us from Eurocentricism to 
decoloniality. 
From 1990s onwards, the multiple modernities approach began to challenge 
the ‘one modernity’ thinking which dominated the modernization theory 
of the previous decades. It was argued that scholars should not look at the 
rest of the world from Europe, but instead accept different trajectories 
12
“Our focus should be on 
oppression and injustice 
not the celebration of 
difference...”
field of Middle East Studies does 
not end up running parallel stories 
to those told at the core of the 
field. Instead we need to question, 
and shift problematic categories 
and understandings of the world. 
We need to shift the canon to 
more adequate accounts rather 
than create yet another form of 
peripherilization.21
Last but not least, I would like 
to end by highlighting that in 
an increasingly globalized and 
interconnected world, the issue 
of diversity and the battle of 
epistemology will not go away 
anywhere soon. In fact, we are 
probably going to see an ever-
increasing friction between those 
who accept diversity and the 
obligations which arise from that 
(for example, the loss of privilege) 
and those who resent and resist 
this loss, lost in their failure to 
understand that cultural plurality 
is woven into European history 
and today. The questioning of 
privilege in epistemology needs to 
be conducted through a defence 
of accuracy and adequacy, not 
through a defence of multiplicity 
and diversity. The convenient 
exclusions are not only unjust to 
those whom the canon excludes, 
but also frustrating for those who 
hold the upper hand as it leaves 
them with an inadequate and 
inaccurate vision of history and 
of today, unable to deal with the 
complexity and diversity in which 
we find ourselves.
15
“...in an 
increasingly 
globalized and 
interconnected 
world, the 
issue of 
diversity and 
the battle of 
epistemology 
will not go 
away ...”
‘Multiculturalism means plural 
monoculturalism. It refers to 
collective categories of difference 
and has a tendency to essentialize 
them… multiculturalism perceives 
cultural differences as -so to speak- 
“little nations” in one nation’.17
‘cosmopolitanism is not 
a generalized version of 
multiculturalism where plurality 
is simply the goal’ 18; ‘[m]
ulticulturalism, too, often results in 
an increase in cultural differences 
as opposed to being a means to 
secure autonomy and justice’.19
‘ours is an effort to move beyond 
multiculturalism’, and to go beyond 
the ‘ultimately essentializing 
nature of culturally and ethno-
religious-based paradigms’.20 
If non-hierarchical acceptance of, and 
engagement with, others is central to 
cosmopolitanism, such caricatured 
criticisms of multiculturalism are 
difficult to follow, if not rather 
uncomfortable. The adversary of 
multiculturalism is monoculturalism 
and assimilation; it is not 
cosmopolitanism. Multiculturalism, 
in its aspiration to allow minoritized 
groups to participate as equals 
in civic and political life, and 
to enhance their claim-making 
capacities within nation-states is 
essential for a cosmopolitan order 
as it also disrupts nationalism and 
naïve national narratives. After all, 
multiculturalism was never purely 
about diversity and difference; it was 
about questioning the upper hand 
that the hegemonic national subjects 
held, allowing minoritized groups to 
make claims and participate on an 
equal footing as civic and political 
citizens. Multiculturalist demands of 
protection from racism and rejection 
of assimilation support, if not overlap 
with, cosmopolitan aspirations. 
A cosmopolitanism which is too 
quick to engage in swift dismissal 
of multiculturalism, and one which 
does not effectively recognize 
multiculturalism’s historical 
struggles against the assimilationist 
policies of the old older, including its 
alliance with anti-racist movements 
in Europe and North America, could 
not be an ally of decolonialism. Nor 
can it purport to be anti-Eurocentric 
if there is curiously little said in the 
work of scholars of cosmopolitanism 
about cultural plurality being woven 
into the fabric of European history 
and society due to colonialism and 
empire.
In summary, the multiple 
modernities paradigm and also some 
of the cosmopolitanism perspectives, 
dominant in fields of, for example, 
history, sociology, politics and 
international relations, have failed to 
move us away from Eurocentricism 
or towards decoloniality. Lessons 
can be learnt here about how not 
to deploy diversity in the field of 
Middle East Studies. In our attempts 
to decolonize, we have to ensure 
that by paying attention to non-
western perspectives, scholars, the 
Global South and the periphery the 
14
end notes
1 This paper follows from the opening keynote I gave at the Institute for 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (IMEIS) Conference at Durham Castle, 
University of Durham, on 19 September 2017. I would like to thank the 
audience and the organizers for the opportunity for intellectual exchange 
and discussion.
2 W. D. Mignolo, ‘Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial 
Freedom’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26:7-8 (2009), 159-181.; W. D. Mignolo, 
The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options 
(Latin America Otherwise). Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
3 S. Boaventure de Sousa, Epistemologies of the South. Boulder, CO: Paradigm 
Publishers, 2014.
4 R. Shilliam, International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, 
Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity, London: Routledge, 2010.
5 G. K. Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological 
Imagination, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.; G. K. Bhambra, 
Connected Sociologies, London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
6 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
7 E. W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, London: Vintage, 1994. 5.
8 Similar to ‘male gaze’ where male perspectives and patriarchy are adopted 
by women.
9 e.g. L. Alcoff, Feminist Epistemologies, London: Routledge, 1993.
10 See for instance the recent debate surrounding the demand to decolonize 
the curriculum at the University of Cambridge: http://www.huffingtonpost.
co.uk/entry/telegraph-lola-olufemi_uk_59f1fe0fe4b077d8dfc7eaf9; https://
www.varsity.co.uk/news/13893.
11 S. N. Eisenstadt, Multiple Modernities, Daedalus, 129:1 (2000), 1–29.
12 P. Wagner, Modernity: Understanding the Present, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2012.
13 G. K. Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological 
Imagination, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
14 For a criticism see B. Gruffydd Jones, ‘International Relations, Eurocentrism 
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and Imperialism’ in Decolonizing International Relations, edited by B. 
Gruffydd Jones. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 1-19.; R. Shilliam, 
International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism 
and Investigations of Global Modernity, London: Routledge, 2010.
15 O. Goksel, ‘Eurocentrism Awakened: The Arab Uprisings and the Search for 
a “Modern” Middle East’ in Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East: Political 
Encounters after the Arab Spring edited by H. Isikal and O. Goskel. New York 
and Heidelberg: Springer, 2017. 33-51.
16 The backlash against multiculturalism in wider political debates and 
European public policy and discourse is also worth noting. It could also be 
captured in the Brexit debate. When surveyed, 80% of those who voted Brexit 
said they saw immigration as a social ill. However multiculturalism topped 
their ‘dislikes’ list, with 81% of them seeing multiculturalism as a social ill. 
See http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-
and-why/.
17 U. Beck, ‘Multiculturalism or Cosmopolitanism: How Can We Describe and 
Understand the Diversity of the World?’, Social Sciences in China, 32:4 (2011). 
54.
18 G. Delanty, ‘The cosmopolitan imagination : critical cosmopolitanism and 
social theory’, The British Journal of Sociology, 57:1 (2006). 35.
19 G. Delanty, ‘Cultural diversity, democracy and the prospects of 
cosmopolitanism: a theory of cultural encounters’, British Journal of Sociology, 
62:4 (2011). 650.
20 N. Glick Schiller; T. Darieva and S. Gruner-Domic, ‘Defining cosmopolitan 
sociability in a transnational age. An introduction’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
34:3 (2011). 401.
21 In my own area of specialism (Kurds, Turkey and Kurdish diaspora), 
for example, I have resisted creating an alternative story of Turkey, an 
indigenous perspective, some sort of a parallel universe. My aim has been 
to unsettle Turkish modernity’s self-image (the story it tells itself) and to 
enable the rethinking, reconstruction and retelling of the story of modernity 
in Turkey which pierces homogeneity claims but is also confident enough 
to carry the perspectives of those whom it erased or attempted to silence 
(Demir, 2014). I move from a mere focus on identity claims to a focus on 
oppression and injustice. In a similar vein, my most recent work, I tilt the 
axis of the Global South scholarship towards the Middle East and the Kurds, 
and discuss the epistemic interventions they make, the way in which they 
expose links between their predicament and Europe, and highlight how they 
advance a transnational indigenous movement (Demir, forthcoming 2018).
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as a civic-myth monarchy9 and 
while the military has been a key 
tool in the construction of the 
Jordanian state, ‘the survival of 
both the Jordanian and Moroccan 
monarchies ultimately depends on 
the loyalty of their armed forces’.10 
There is a broad array of scholarship 
that examines the strategies, 
policies, and mechanisms with 
which authoritarian states employ 
to prolong their reign. Some 
of the most prominent have 
been Nathan’s Authoritarian 
Resilience,11 Brownlee’s Authoritarian 
Durability,12 Heydemann’s Upgrading 
Authoritarianism13, Gerschewski’s 
Three Pillars of Stability14, and Levitsky’s 
Competitive Authoritarianism.15 
Instead of looking at the wide 
array of approaches, the applied 
interpretation of regime security 
will focus on the regime’s control 
of the coercive apparatus. 
Quinlivan16 , Brooks17 , and Bellin18 
lead the field of scholarship 
within this domain, and in doing 
so, illustrate several common 
themes. Quinlivan defines coup-
proofing ‘as the set of actions a 
regime takes to prevent a military 
coup’19 and highlights five common 
characteristics of this practice: 
exploitation of family, ethnic, 
and religious loyalties, parallel 
armed forces, development 
of multiple internal security 
agencies, fostering of expertness, 
and the ability to finance these 
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‘Of all the ethnic minorities in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan none 
occupies a higher position of social 
importance nor wields such tremendous 
political and economic power than does 
a related group of peoples known in 
English as Circassians and in Arabic as 
Sharakisah’1
A prominent feature of Middle 
Eastern-focused regime security 
strategies is the exploitation and 
utilisation of minority groups. 
While in homogenous societies this 
strategy can stress social ties, in 
heterogeneous societies the division 
between the minority group, society, 
and the regime, can represent 
substantial benefits. Prominent 
contemporary examples of this 
strategy include the Assad regime’s 
long-standing relationship with 
the Alawite, Circassian, and Druze 
communities2 , and Sunni rule in 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein3 , while 
across the GCC states (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]), 
some of the most significant security 
portfolios are directly supported by 
Western expatriates. 
The role of minority groups within 
Jordan presents a unique case study 
because of the fluidity and alien 
nature of their societal stratification 
and, subsequently, their predominant 
confinement to security related 
jurisdictions. Because the reign of 
King Hussein faced a dynamic threat 
environment, from both internal 
and external sources, it was crucial 
for his own survival to have trusted 
personnel whom he could rely on. 
Thus, this article applies orthodox 
interpretations of regime security 
strategy to examine the role of 
Jordanian Circassian and Chechen 
communities under King Hussein. 
Regime Security Strategy
Regime security is distinct from 
national and state security, and 
is defined as ‘the condition where 
governing elites are secure from 
violent challenges to their rule’.4 
Regime security strategy is nominally 
applied to non-Western third-world 
states, as, in contrast to Western 
conceptions of security, third-world 
security encapsulates ‘the whole 
range of dimensions of a state’s 
existence5’. This is compounded 
by Job’s assumption that illiberal 
countries are inherently weak6 and 
thus determines the fact that ‘for 
weak states, the domestic sphere 
is actually far more dangerous and 
threatening than the international 
sphere’.7 
Due to the structure of power 
relations within illiberal states, 
one that heightens the significance 
of the regime over the state and 
the government, it is common for 
authoritarian forms of governance 
to dominate societal relations. 
Ayubi postulates that within a 
Middle Eastern context this has 
often ensured that power gravitates 
around three poles of power: Military, 
President, and the Party.8 According 
to Kamrava, Jordan is classified 
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measures’.20 Writing a year earlier, 
Brooks echoed many of Quinlivan’s 
coup proofing theory, postulating 
four predominant approaches 
employed by Arab states to maintain 
power: increase non-military support 
cultivating social, economic and 
religious groups, court the military 
elites, disproportionately appoint 
minorities to key posts (‘stacking 
the deck’), and frequently rotate 
elites.21 Bellin updates the analysis 
of regime security within the Middle 
East by framing this technique within 
a post-Arab Spring environment; she 
suggests four prevalent factors which 
have enabled Middle Eastern regimes 
to maintain power throughout this 
turbulent period: ensure funding 
for the coercive apparatus, cultivate 
international alliances, preserve 
the low institutionalisation of 
the coercive apparatus, and deter 
significant popular mobilisation.22 
While Bellin’s analysis expands on 
previous scholarship by incorporating 
externally influencing factors, the 
present analysis focuses on the 
management practises of the regime 
itself. Building upon the scholarship 
of Quinlivan, Brooks, and Bellin, this 
analysis aims to highlight the four 
predominant traits of regime security 
within the Middle East:
• Exploitation of Tribal, Ethnic, 
and Sectarian Linkages
• Development of Coercive 
Apparatus 
• Strategic Human Resources 
Management 
• Guaranteed Financial Resources 
This article will demonstrate how 
King Hussein relied upon minority 
groups throughout his reign, and 
employed these four strategies to 
reinforce his own reign.
Circassians and Chechens  
in Jordan 
While the distinct identity and 
historiography of Circassian and 
Chechen communities within Jordan 
has only recently come to light, they 
were often grouped within their 
original designation within a Middle 
Eastern context: Mamlukes. Both 
communities originate from the 
North Caucasus and were victims 
of the Russian empire’s aggression 
throughout the 19th century where 
many fled to the neighbouring 
Ottoman empire.23 Ahmed Shurdom 
details that ‘the real primary route for 
Circassians who settled in Jordan was 
from Circassia to Bulgaria to Turkey, 
then to Jordan’.24 
The earlier migration of Circassian 
and Chechen communities to the 
Middle East occurred in the 14th 
century25 when Circassian slaves 
ruled Mamluke Egypt. The first 
dynasty occurred in 1382 when 
Emir Berkuck ruled the Burjite era. 
During his tenure, the Ottoman 
empire increased its presence within 
the Levant resulting in the initial 
formation of Circassian communities 
across Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. 
It should be noted that while 
Amman is the modern day capital 
of Jordan, it was previously only a 
village ‘numbering around 5,000 
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inhabitants, the majority Circassians and Syrian merchants’.26 Richmond 
notes that Circassian families started to arrive in Amman from 1878, however 
encountered considerable difficulties adjusting to the new environmental and 
social geography.27 
Due to the martial nature and steadfast mentality of Circassian and Chechen 
peoples, they have often been employed within the security apparatus of their 
host country. Posner firmly hypothesis that the ‘Circassians have historically 
tried to protect their interests by supporting the regime in power’.28 Distinct 
from their neighbours, the Ottomans employed the Circassians and Chechens 
as part of a border force against the Arabs, with the minority communities 
enjoying an enhanced role within the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF).2930
Later under the British and its representative Captain Peake, the Transjordan 
Reserve Force was created and manned primarily by Circassians.31 This was 
the precursor to the Arab Legion and helps to explain why from such an early 
period the Circassians have been an integral aspect of the Jordanian military. 
Brigadier General Mirza Pasha was a prominent Circassian within the Ottoman 
Empire’s Arabian Peninsula protection force, later becoming a leading figure 
within King Abdullah’s reign. Weightman highlights the significance of Mirza 
Pasha’s support for King Abdullah by saying ‘his later support helped make 
possible the establishment of the Hashemite monarchy in Transjordan’.32 
Deemed as neutral participants, the Circassians and Chechens were efficient 
partners in the de-escalation of tribal conflict within Transjordan. Surviving 
initial difficulties, the Circassians later aligned with the prominent Bani Sakhr 
against other tribes such as the Balqawiyeh, most predominantly in the 1900 
war. Later when the Hashemites arrived in Transjordan in 1921, Circassian 
leaders welcomed Emir Abdullah into Amman and offered a team of personal 
bodyguards, forming the basis for the modern day Circassian Royal Guard.33 
Richmond further explains that the early leadership and dedication shown 
by the Circassians in defending the Hashemites against external threats laid 
the groundwork for their heightened political-military role within Jordan. 
Tai goes as far to hypothesise that ‘co-opted by Abdullah at state formation, 
Circassians, Chechens, and Christians stocked the elite units of the armed 
forces and furnished policymakers who prospered in the upper echelons of 
the ruling coalition’.34 
The Circassians and Chechens have been widely employed across the 
Jordanian security apparatus, where, in addition to their monopoly within 
the Royal Guard, they have enjoyed considerable representation within the 
Jordanian Armed Forces, General Intelligence Department (GID), and Ministry 
Jordan are in Amman, Jerash, Wadi Seer, Sweileh, Na’our, Zarqa, Rusaifa, 
Sukhneh, and Azraq Al-Shaishan. Because of the concentration of Circassian 
and Chechen communities within Amman, and the wealth this brought 
them when Amman was later designated the capital of Jordan, Circassian 
and Chechen communities were often the target of resentment from other 
communities. 
A common strategic feature of the areas inhibited by the Circassians and 
Chechens was that they all were situated close to sources of fresh water, and 
were urban in nature; that contrasts with the Arab tribes who thrived in rural 
desert environments. The collective emotional trauma and social code, Adiga 
Khabza, that binds the minority communities distinguishes them from their 
Arab counterparts and heavily emphasises loyalty, patriarchy, and discipline. 
The pre-installed virtues mirror the values required to succeed within a 
military career and help to rationalise why and how their relationship with 
the Hashemite monarchy has thrived. 
Building upon the relationship between the monarchy and the Circassian and 
Chechen communities, the 1928 electoral law reserved two seats (now three) 
for the minority groups at a favourable rate (one seat for every 5,000 citizens 
versus one seat for ever 27,000 Arabs). The decision to denote Amman as the 
capital of Transjordan also gave the Circassians an advantage, as this is where 
they enjoyed a heightened presence and owned a lot of land around the city. 
This allowed Circassian figures to be heavily prominent within the early stages 
of Jordanian history, with Omar Hickmat assuming the position as Minister 
of Justice, Wasfi Pasha (son of Mirza Pasha), and Saeed Pasha al Mufti all key 
examples of this analysis – the latter was a mainstay in Jordan’s early political 
leadership assuming the office of Prime Minister three times over his civil 
service career (1950, 1955, and 1956).43 Furthermore, Circassian leaders Walid 
Tash and Mohammed Ali Amin Shuqman held senior positions within the 
foreign ministry serving as Secretary General and Foreign Minister respectively. 
Considering their diminutive profile within Jordanian society, it is surprising 
that so many Circassian and Chechen Jordanians retained so much power, 
so uniformly under King Hussein. Therefore, the relationship between King 
Hussein and the Circassian and Chechen minorities presents a unique case 
study for the observation of regime security strategy within the Middle East.
Manifestations of Internal Threats to King Hussein 
King Hussein was inaugurated as King of Jordan on the 2nd May 1953 and 
had been heavily exposed to the trials and tribulations of leadership before he 
took office. Throughout his reign, King Hussein faced a series of threats which 
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of Interior (MOI). Posner even goes 
as far as saying that ‘Circassian 
fighters have long been considered 
among the most effective in the 
Middle East. Circassian soldiers 
once formed the backbone of King 
Hussein’s army in Jordan’.35 This 
narrative forms part of a larger 
trend within Circassian history 
where, as Alon notes, Circassians fit 
an obvious profile for armed forces 
personnel: ‘Brunton recruited to 
the force (Arab Legion) ex-soldiers 
of the Ottoman and Arab Armies 
who were wandering the streets of 
Amman, as well as Circassians. The 
latter seemed perfect for the job’.36 
Literature pertaining to the 
Circassians and Chechens is 
generally limited, let alone 
when specified to Jordan. 
Beyond Mackey’s 1979 thesis37, 
Shami’s 1984 PhD38, Bullough’s 
Let Our Fame be Great39, and a 
series of cultural and historical 
monologues by Jaimoukha40, 
Jordanian Circassian and Chechen 
communities have tended to be a 
by-line in larger studies on Jordan. 
This is somewhat understandable 
when seen in the context of 
Mackey’s notes that inform 
analysis, indicating that in 
1979 Circassians made up 1% 
of the Jordanian population41 
and in summary occupy a 
‘disproportionately influential 
political and economic position’.42 
Concentrations of Circassian and 
Chechen communities within 
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if managed differently, would have 
led to a republican revolution. 
Jordan’s position between Egypt, 
Israel, Palestinian Territories, 
Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia has 
consistently stressed the Kingdom’s 
internal security dynamics. The 
osmosis of political ideologies 
into Jordan, and particularly Arab 
Nationalism, Muslim Brotherhood, 
and Salafi Islam, as well as the 
significant presence and frustrations 
of Palestinians within Jordan, have 
all contributed to the insecurity 
dilemma of the Jordanian monarchy. 
Since the United Nation’s 1947 
decision to partition British mandated 
Palestine, the neighbouring Emirate 
of Transjordan faced a considerable 
threat from the Palestinians whom 
it was believed would attempt 
to undermine Hashemite rule.44 
While initially united by a desire 
to retain Palestinian lands, Arab 
forces combated the UN resolution, 
under the leadership of Glubb Pasha. 
The Arab Legion held the West 
Bank ensuring the Palestinians a 
homeland; significantly, one that was 
not Jordan. King Abdullah bin Hussein 
accepted the partition of Palestine to 
ensure the cohesion and integrity of 
his own Kingdom, albeit, per critics, 
at the cost of the Palestinians.45 
While Abdullah failed to normalise 
relations with the Israelis, his 
willingness to engage them over 
potential boundaries enraged many 
Arab states and the Palestinian 
population. Consequently, on the 
20th July 1951 he was assassinated 
by a Palestinian nationalist whilst 
attending Friday prayers at Al-Aqsa 
Mosque in Jerusalem. His Grandson, 
King Hussein was accompanying him 
on this trip and was also targeted 
by the assassin, however quite 
remarkably, was saved by the fact 
that a military medal attached to his 
uniform deflected the bullet that was 
intended to take his life.46 The care 
and support offered by members of 
the Arab Legion and his royal guard 
left an imprint on his mind-set, one 
that heightened his relationship 
to the military and its personnel. 
Therefore, and in line with regime 
security strategy, the political-
military relationship was a critical 
and paramount concern for King 
Hussein throughout his reign.
 
Crisis of 1957
Pressured by anti-colonial and 
nationalist organisations such as the 
Free Jordanian Officers, and a growing 
deterioration in their professional 
relationship, King Hussein dismissed 
Glubb Pasha in 1956. A key advisor and 
friend to King Hussein throughout 
this period was Major Ali Abu Nuwar. 
He was the Jordanian defence attaché 
to France while King Hussein was at 
Sandhurst in the UK, and upon the 
King’s return to Amman, Ali Abu 
Nuwar was appointed King Hussein’s 
Aide de Camp (ADC).
While Ali Abu Nuwar did not 
immediately take over from Glubb 
Pasha, he was appointed Major 
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General and Chief of Staff of the 
Arab Legion three months after 
Glubb Pasha’s dismissal.47 Some 
accounts suggest that Ali Abu 
Nuwar’s appointment was aimed at 
appeasing sections of the military and 
preventing the possible formation 
of a praetorian guard. In hindsight, 
King Hussein clearly understood that 
it was crucial for the survival of the 
monarchy to retain the allegiance 
of the Armed Forces, with Lunt 
highlighting ‘Hussein’s chief concern 
was his army’.48 
Motivated by pan-Arab nationalist 
and Baathist ideology, and combined 
with a ground swell of republican 
support, which had been bolstered 
by the dismissal of Prime Minister 
Sulayman al-Nabulsi, Ali Abu Nuwar 
executed a coup attempt in April 
1957. For his involvement, Ali Abu 
Nuwar was exiled to Syria and the 
military’s support for the monarchy 
thrived. Since then, material support 
for the Jordanian military has 
increased and ‘so long as the legion 
in Jordan remains a privileged group 
in this material-economic sense, the 
possibility of coups is not eradicated 
but lessened’.49 Dann notes that 
because of the attempted coup by 
educated secularists ‘Hussein and 
the army’s beduin [sic] contingent 
had recognised their mutual 
dependence’.50 
The threat of 1957 emanated primarily 
from the military, and particularly 
from its headquarters in Zarqa. 
While King Hussein could quietly 
and delicately de-escalate tensions, 
a period of reflection and observation 
was needed to assess the weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities highlighted by 
this event. Reorganising all tiers of 
the military, King Hussein relied upon 
trusted allies such as Habis al-Majali 
and Sadiq al-Shar’a to implement 
further changes and investigations. 
Some reports suggest up to 200 
officers were relieved of duty for 
their involvement in this affair with 
Mackey noting that no Circassian 
officer was implicated in the 1957 
plot.51 The virtue of loyalty, which 
is strongly adorned in Circassian 
and Chechen culture, also helps to 
explain why a Circassian Brigadier 
General ‘Izzat Hassan Quandour, 
was appointed to take charge of the 
Zerqa investigation’52 and suggests, 
as part of a larger trend, a respect for 
the minority’s impartiality in times of 
significant instability. 
Crisis of 1958
In response to the spread of Arab 
Nationalism and the 22nd February 
1958 formation of the United Arab 
Republic (UAR), the two houses of 
the Hashemite monarchy united to 
form the Arab Federation of Iraq 
and Jordan. Upon discovery, and 
further assisted by the Israelis, it 
came to King Hussein’s attention 
that simultaneous coups were being 
planned in Baghdad and Amman with 
assistance from Arab nationalists in 
the UAR. 
In Jordan, the manifestation of this 
threat was led by Lieutenant Colonel 
Black September 1970 
The most significant and 
destructive moment in Jordan’s 
history was the 1970 civil war. 
Motivated by years of demoralising 
defeats at the hands of the Israelis, 
growing confidence of fedayeen 
(insurgents) operating within 
Jordan, and a significant increase 
in Palestinian refugees resettling 
in Jordan following the 1967 
war, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) publically 
confronted King Hussein in a bid to 
subvert his reign and commandeer 
Jordan for its own resource. 
Split across numerous groups, 
including the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and 
independent fedayeen units, the 
conglomerate faction of Palestinian 
fighters within Jordan was the PLO. 
It was headed by Yasser Arafat and 
enjoyed significant material and 
diplomatic support from Egypt60, 
Syria, and the Soviet Union (USSR). 
Pushed back by Israeli forces, 
Palestinian fedayeen retreated 
into Jordanian territory, enticing 
engagement between Israeli and 
Jordanian forces. This resulted in 
a classical insecurity dilemma for 
King Hussein as he did not have a 
monopoly over the application of 
violence within his territory. As 
Bailey notes ‘beginning in April 
1969, however, the attitude of 
the regime itself (King Hussein’s) 
31
“Pushed back 
by Israeli 
forces, 
Palestinian 
fedayeen 
retreated 
into Jordanian 
territory...”
Mahmud Rusan, who had just returned from the US as Deputy Chief of the 
Jordanian Embassy.53 
On the 14th July 1958, the Iraqi branch of the Hashemite monarchy were 
slaughtered along with several high ranking political officials from the Arab 
Federation.54 Dann hypothesises that Rusan planned to murder King Hussein 
in his palace and proclaim a republic in its place. 
Understanding the peril of his circumstance, insofar that a cousin had been 
murdered by republicans, prevalent sympathy of Arab nationalism across the 
Middle East, and securitisation of social opposition from the Palestinians 
and educated liberals, King Hussein fell back upon the traditional tenants of 
support and allegiance: namely the military. 
Reacting nearly immediately where possible, loyal sections of the Jordanian 
Armed Forces prevented popular uprisings in prominent urban centres by 
employing preventative tactics such as martial law. An observation of the 
relative calm of Nablus within this turbulent period was attributed to ‘Brigadier 
‘Izzat Hasan, who as a Circassian was considered impervious to treachery and 
thus given a free hand’.55 
Hussein was suffocated on all sides as Nasser’s UAR attempted to encroach 
on Jordan, while Saudi Arabia denied overflights to Jordan, and resultantly, 
King Hussein accepted Israeli assistance against the republican threat closing 
in on Amman.56 King Hussein’s deliberation and discussion of the fragility 
of the situation with his parliament and senate, and the necessity to work 
with Israel, is claimed by Lunt to have safeguarded his reign.57 When speaking 
about the Saudi betrayal of Jordan in his autobiography King Hussein notes: 
‘to the end of my life I will never forget this action against my country and my 
people in this hour of need’.58 The observation of King Hussein’s predicament 
and reliance on traditional values such as loyalty and allegiance helps to 
explain the strength of the relationship between the Jordanian monarchy and 
the Circassian and Chechen communities. 
Empowered by a growing population of British soldiers, King Hussein 
positioned Bedouin troops in Amman, and made regular visits to the military 
headquarters in Zarqa in a bid to rally support and allegiance. There were 
several high-profile dismissals and subsequent promotions, and ensured 
a bulwark for King Hussein’s reign. After a period of self-led isolation, King 
Hussein again reshuffled the military hierarchy and employed his uncle, Sharif 
Nasir bin Jamil to lead the purges within the military.59
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their allegiance to the PLO.67 Over two weeks the Jordanian army heavily 
attacked and engaged Palestinian forces across Jordan. There were several 
prominent Circassians within the military during Black September with 
brothers, Tahseen and Ihsan Shurdom standout examples. The former was a 
Brigadier General and Commander of the Special Forces while Tahseen was 
commander of the 62nd Special Forces brigade. Tahseen was later appointed 
Head of Military Intelligence, Chief of Staff, and Director of Public Security 
while Ihsan commanded the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF).
King Hussein successfully reclaimed his kingdom, evicting the PLO and other 
guerrillas from his territory. Coupled with loss of responsibility of the West 
Bank because of the failed 1967 war, King Hussein could concentrate on 
Jordanian nationalist discourse and disregard parallel ideological threats with 
whom were now beholden to the Monarchy. This allowed him to continue his 
state and nation building programme through the vehicle of the military, as 
it served a dual purpose of shoring his ideological and physical reign. This 
programme ensured a heightened presence for the Circassians and Chechens 
with whom dominate the range of Jordanian security entities. 
Significance of the Circassians under Hussein
As a minority group with intimate links to the Hashemite dynasty, the future 
of the Circassians and Chechens in Jordan is intimately linked to that of the 
Monarch. As a non-Arab liberal Muslim group, the Circassians and Chechens 
were relied upon throughout King Hussein’s reign for support in face of 
ideological threats such as Arab Nationalism and Palestinian independence. 
The collective experience of the Circassians and Chechens at the hands of the 
Russians also grounds their mindset and helps to drive their allegiance to the 
ruling power in each domain they reside. Because of their professionalism, 
ideological impartiality, allegiance to the monarchy, and technocratic rise in 
the British led Arab Legion, Circassian officers were in an optimal space to 
assume early leadership within the Jordanian Armed Forces. This continued 
33
“King Hussein 
successfully reclaimed 
his kingdom...”
stiffened toward fedayeen operations 
from Jordan’.61 The interpretation 
of security policies and directives 
of King Hussein’s reign indicate a 
dichotomy where any move to secure 
his own rule, authority, and territorial 
integrity would irk regional “allies” 
as it was common for this to be in 
contravention of the regional good. 
This was mainly due to the region 
wide support for the Palestinians 
and when placed in context of the 
1967 war and Arab nationalism, 
King Hussein was stuck in a policy 
dichotomy that could have led to his 
usurpation. 
However, this meant that Jordan 
and King Hussein would have to 
bear the price and responsibility of 
Palestinian actions. This reached a 
climax in February 1970 when after 
months of aggression between Israel 
and the fedayeen within Jordanian 
territory, often injuring Jordanian 
bystanders and stressing Israeli-
Jordanian ties, King Hussein imposed 
10 restrictions upon the Fedayeen.62 
Palestinian groups reacted, 
immediately organising into military 
commands and engaged in clashes in 
Amman, where over 300 were killed. 
Throughout 1970 Jordanian military 
units and political entities were 
commonly targeted by Palestinians 
and King Hussein narrowly survived 
a series of assassination attempts 
by the PLO and its affiliates.63 The 
Palestinians also routinely kidnapped 
Jordanian military personnel and the 
1970 detention of two Circassian GID 
officers near Zarqa was a standout 
example, as one of the two captives, 
Awni Yervas, later became the 
Minister of Interior (MOI).64 
While Arafat claimed to be in 
opposition to violence towards King 
Hussein and Jordan, he was unable 
to curtail violence from groups 
operating under his banner. When the 
PFLP hijacked three airplanes ‘Arafat 
felt he could not discredit them and 
retain his position of leadership. As 
a result, he joined the extremists’.65 
The result of Arafat’s decision not 
only united these groups under the 
PLO, but also polarised Jordan and 
emboldened the monarchy, where like 
in previous scenarios, King Hussein 
fell back upon the military for support 
and imposed military rule. In order to 
do this however, King Hussein had 
to fire the pro-Palestinian Chief of 
Staff, Manshoor Haditha and bring 
out of retirement Field Marshal Habis 
Majali66; Majali had previously been a 
key ally in the 1957 crisis. 
Understanding that Jordan was under 
a blanket of Palestinian control, 
with many cities and security units 
dominated by Palestinians, the King 
utilised the military and trusted allies 
to purge the Kingdom of the internal 
threat to his rule. On 17th September, 
the Jordanian military targeted 
Palestinian political offices, refugee 
camps, and other parts of the city 
they had come to dominate. Earlier 
on the 14th September, the newly 
appointed head of the GID, Major 
General Natheer Pasha Rashid fired a 
third of his officers who had declared 
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throughout the reign of King 
Hussein and resulted in widespread 
participation in the military and 
political elite. In a statement 
of intent, King Hussein’s eldest 
daughter, Princess Alia bint Hussein 
married Nasser Wasfi Mirza, the son 
of prominent Circassian politician 
Wasfi Mirza. 
The recruitment and figures relating 
to Circassian participation within 
the Jordanian military during King 
Hussein’s rule remain imprecise; 
however, there is an acknowledgement 
that they made up ten per cent of the 
whole officer corps.68 Vatikiotis notes 
that in 1956, Jordanian Circassians 
commanded two of ten infantry 
regiments, and when put in context of 
the British managing five regiments, 
helps to underscore early on that the 
Circassians were a dominant presence 
within the Jordanian Armed Forces.69 
Further stressing this, and in the 
context of the 1957, 1957, and Black 
September crises, ‘by the 1980s, four 
Circassians had served in succession 
as directors of Jordanian security’.70 
Reviewing the instability caused 
by Black September, Posner asserts 
that ‘Circassian officers and fighting 
men played a critical role in crushing 
an effort to overthrow Hussein’s 
Hashemite monarchy’.71 Due to 
their fierce loyalty to the monarchy 
however, they were often the target 
of violence by the Palestinians, 
and Shurdom was forced to dispel 
the notion that there was a ‘special 
militia unit made up of Circassian[s] 
and under a Circassian command, 
who implemented these operations 
and killed the Palestinians’.72 Yet, as 
Mackey notes, the most advanced 
and capable unit within the Jordanian 
armed forces was the Commando unit 
and ‘It is predominantly Circassian 
(approximately 75~80%) and was 
heavily used in the civil strife during 
1970’.73 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that throughout 
King Hussein’s early reign he was 
dependent upon the military. 
In a series of classical coup-
proofing manoeuvres King Hussein 
manipulated and selectively 
strengthened his armed forces at 
times of critical instability. A key 
aspect of this was his relationship 
with the Circassian and Chechen 
communities. In context of such little 
stature, the wide proliferation of 
appointments within security related 
roles highlights King Hussein’s 
interpretation of the significance of 
the Circassians and Chechens within 
his regime security strategy. While 
relying on elder trusted allies in times 
of need, consistently, King Hussein 
relied upon the minority groups for 
his bulwark. 
It is also evident that while 
consistently the Circassians and 
Chechens did rise to the top of the 
military professions, they were 
aided by the stressed importance of 
the Jordanian Armed Forces. Their 
martial and physical traits further 
aided their progression where even in 
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Name Position (s) Period
Ibrahim Pasha Othman Kashoqa 1st Commander of the RJAF 1956-1962
Izzat Pasha Qandour 9th Commander of the Jordanian 
Public Security Directorate
1969-1970
Anwar Pasha Mohammed 12th Commander of the Jordanian 
Public Security Directorate
1971-1976
Ma’moun Pasha Khalil Ha’opsh 14th Commander of the Jordanian 
Public Security Directorate
1979-1981
Mohammed Pasha Idris Dodokh 15th Commander of the Jordanian 
Public Security Directorate
1981-1984
Thyab Pasha Yousef 16th Commander Jordanian of 
the Public Security Directorate
1984-1985
Tahseen Shurdom 22nd Director of Public Security 
Chief of Staff and Head of 
Military Intelligence
2002-2004
Ihsan Shurdom 9th Commander of the Royal 
Jordanian Air Force (RJAF)
1983-1993
Awni Pasha Belal 10th Commander of the RJAF 1993-1994
Hussein Pasha Ahmad Shodash 
Shapsoug
16th Commander of the RJAF 2006-2010
Ahmad Ala’addin al-Shishani General Inspector and Commander 
of the Jordanian Armed Forces
Awni Yervas Minister of Interior
Izzat Hasan Quandour Chief of Staff
Fawwaz Mahir Birmamit Chief of Staff
Mohammed Idris Chief of Staff
Walid Tash Secretary General of the Foreign 
Ministry
Mohammed Ali Amin Governor of Amman 1987-
Kheiredin Hakouz Former Commander of the Special 
Forces Circassian Member of 
Parliament
Mansour Pasha Hakouz Commander of the Southern Region 
General Inspector of the Army
Tareq Pasha Ala’eddin Bersik 7th Commander of the GID
Umran Khamash Brigadier General in the Jordanian 
Special Forces & Governor of Jerash
Prominent Military Positions Assumed by Jordanian Circassians under King Hussein
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the modern day, there are Circassian 
and Chechen only battalions within 
the Jordanian special forces. That is 
in combination with the Jordanian 
Royal Guard which is made up only of 
Circassian soldiers. 
While King Hussein rotated his 
military’s leadership to deny the 
development of a praetorian guard, 
it has been shown that the Circassian 
community was a long standing 
trusted ally of King Hussein. The 
evidence of Circassian leadership 
within the military and public 
security directorate indicates the 
communities’ domination of the 
Jordanian security apparatus. 
Due to their apolitical stance 
throughout King Hussein’s rule, the 
monarchy could rely on the minority 
group for support at critical junctures. 
While in the short term the presence 
of Circassians and Chechen physically 
ensured the survival of the monarchy 
in Jordan, they also emboldened King 
Hussein during his negotiations with 
Israel and other international actors. 
Because of these negotiations, Jordan 
could benefit from financial packages 
and thus aid the continuation of 
Hashemite rule. 
The evidence of such a small 
minority evoking such dependability 
and allegiance helps scholarship 
to understand the durability of 
regimes within the Middle East. 
Where within the same period, civil 
war and interstate conflict induced 
periods of instability, the Jordanian 
military provided the Hashemite 
monarchy with unrivalled stability 
and conformity. As a product of a 
long running program of nation and 
state building, the Jordanian Armed 
Forces will remain a long and trusted 
ally of the Hashemite monarchy. 
The Circassians and Chechens play 
a significant role within this and 
thus cannot be overlooked in the 
evaluation of the stability of the 
monarchy in Jordan. 
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Islamist forces didn’t agree with 
Jinnah’s idea of establishing an 
Islamic state and then setting it on 
a liberal and secular course. 
In the years leading up to the 
partition of India, seeds of hatred, 
bigotry and discrimination were 
sowed among the masses on the 
basis of their religious affiliations.7 
Immediately after Pakistan became 
an independent state in 1947, it 
was not just non-Muslims that 
became victims of discriminatory 
identity politics: a number of 
minority Muslim groups also 
came to experience a systematic 
victimization and deprivation of 
basic human rights in the name of 
implementing true Islamic values.8 
Jinnah who rightly wanted to 
keep religion and state apart, 
became the first major victim 
of his country’s political and 
religious elite’s vision that not only 
sought to establish Pakistan as an 
Islamic state but also a state that 
legitimized and institutionalized 
‘Sunni majoritarianism’, which 
intensified following the partition 
of Pakistan.9 Pakistan’s more than 
70 percent population adheres to 
the Sunni sect of Islam and has over 
the last six decades attained central 
role in terms of defining religious 
legitimacy, ideological acceptance 
and rejection and citizenship at the 
constitutional and state level.10 
However ironic it may seem but the 
founder of Pakistan, a Shia Muslim 
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“...a number of 
minority Muslim 
groups also came 
to experience 
a systematic 
victimization 
and deprivation 
of basic human 
rights...”
Introduction and Historical 
Reasons
Debate regarding the role of Islam 
in the creation of Pakistan has 
remained a central and contentious 
issue throughout Pakistan’s history. 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder 
of Pakistan led a campaign that was 
blended in the region’s political, 
cultural and religious realities.1 To 
this day, scholars remain divided over 
the question of whether Pakistan 
Movement was truly motivated by 
religion or the use of religion became 
necessary in order to mobilize Muslim 
masses of the subcontinent region.2 
Moreover, scholars also continue to 
puzzle over the question of whether 
Jinnah wanted a progressive and 
secular state or a religious and 
theocratic state.3 
If one is to closely follow Jinnah’s 
statements and the way he 
approached the Pakistan Movement, 
it becomes clear that he himself was 
torn between two extremes that 
dealt with creating a state which 
ought to be progressive in nature or 
a theocratic one, which should be 
conservative in outlook and practice. 
Amid these two extremes lingered 
Jinnah’s dilemma: Jinnah preferred 
an independent Muslim state that 
would follow progressive and liberal 
ideals of Islam rather than reactionary 
and conservative Islam.4 However, 
in essence, majority of Jinnah’s 
followers didn’t agree with his vision 
of a liberal and secular Muslim 
state whose electoral strength was 
virtually based on the argument of 
creating an ‘Islamic Muslim state’. 
Moreover, in this regard, Jinnah’s 
dilemma stayed with his inability to 
mobilize the Muslim masses beyond 
the perimeters of Muslim political 
identity, which perhaps remained one 
of his biggest challenges. 
As Tunzelmann notes that ‘In the 
face of resurgent Islamic nationalism 
inside his own state, he [Jinnah] 
continued to insist that “Pakistan 
is not going to be a theocratic state 
to be ruled by priests with a divine 
mission. We have many non-Muslims 
– Hindus, Christians and Priests – 
but they are all Pakistanis. They will 
enjoy the same rights and privileges 
as any other citizens and will play 
their rightful part in the affairs of 
Pakistan”’.5 Further highlighting 
Jinnah’s predicament of engaging 
with the idea of Muslim identity 
politics, Alex contends that ‘Jinnah’s 
strategy to achieve Pakistan by 
exploiting the extremes of identity 
politics had been extraordinarily 
successful. Unfortunately his plan to 
run Pakistan as a progressive liberal 
democracy with a moderate Islamic 
flavor had been marked less worked 
out’.6 
It’s a bitter reality that after 
spending two decades stirring up 
Islamic passions, Jinnah wanted to 
implement a progressive version of 
Islam in Pakistan which practically 
seemed impossible as a large number 
of Jinnah’s Muslim supporters had a 
very different idea of what Pakistan 
might be. All in all, conservative 
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by Islamic faith was given two separate funerals: One funeral that was held 
privately followed Shia rituals and the other which was held publically and 
attended by thousands of Pakistanis was according to Sunni rituals.11 As Kalia 
in his book, Pakistan: From the Rhetoric of Democracy to the Rise of Militancy 
argues that ‘The two funerals symbolized not an expression of religious 
toleration but a political choice to appropriate Jinnah to the dominant Sunni 
strain of Islam – repudiating not only Jinnah’s personal Shia faith but also his 
secular political beliefs’.12 Debate over Jinnah’s belief was only a preface to 
religious zealotry that commenced after his death. 
As Ahmad and Rafique argue that ‘The Muslim League leadership heralded 
the Pakistan movement that eventually assumed the character of an ever 
expanding project of Islamization after partition. The state sought to use 
religion as an instrument of policy of legitimizing partition and later de-
ethicizing politics. Over the years, religion sought to define the state itself’.13 
The Blasphemy Law and the institutionalizing of ‘majoritarian’ 
Islamist politics
After the passing of Jinnah, Pakistan’s political leadership could not resist 
demands of Islamist parties to introduce Sharia system in the country. Jinnah’s 
vision of treating all communities equally without the difference of faith was 
never truly implemented in Pakistan. Striping the country’s minority Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities of their basic human rights began right after 
partition. The persecution of the country’s minority Muslim communities that 
began in 1948 became widespread in 1953 when fundamentalist groups incited 
by Sunni conservative clerks destroyed Ahmadya Muslim community’s places 
of worship.14 The attack on the Ahmadya community in 1953 was actually the 
widespread beginning of a ‘violent narrative’ that eventually manifested in the 
form of the Blasphemy Law which institutionalized bigotry, intolerance and 
discrimination on the basis of a majoritarian view of what a Islamic religious 
practice was appropriate and acceptable in the country. 
In a famous case in Pakistan, called the ‘Zaheeruddin v. State’ which defines the 
institutionalization of majoritarian politics and Islamization of the country, 
a top court in Pakistan gave a verdict that Ahmadi Muslims cannot even 
challenge the constitutionality of the Blasphemy law by using Article 20 of the 
constitution which promises freedom of religion to all citizens. Moreover, to 
validate its verdict the court said that by practicing their religion ‘the Ahmadis 
would interfere with the human rights of others and so they are not protected 
by Article 20 of the constitution’.15 Basically the court argued that Ahmadi 
Muslim sect which doesn’t even make 2 % of the country’s population by only 
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practicing its religion can interfere 
and undermine the human rights 
of more than 60 % of the country’s 
Sunni population.
The codification of the 
Blasphemy Law doesn’t only 
discriminate among Muslims on 
the basis of ‘majoritarianism and 
minoritarianism’ Islamic identity 
but also demonizes non Muslim 
communities by directly and indirectly 
segregating them by presenting them 
as a threat to Islam and its values. 
As Ispahani in her book, Purifying 
the Land of the Pure: A History of 
Pakistan’s Religious Minorities, 
argues that ‘Religious freedom and 
the rights of religious minorities to 
live in peace is being threatened by 
communal majoritarianism, which 
has been at the heart of Pakistan’s 
policies over the years. This trend 
reflects the majority insistence that 
the religious minorities practice 
their faith and culture within limits 
prescribed by the majority’.16 
A secular law that was enacted during 
the colonial period for the protection 
of all religious communities existing 
in the subcontinent at that time 
was turned into an instrument of 
discrimination in 1986 in Pakistan. 
The act of blasphemy under article 
295 (c) of the constitution was made 
publishable by death. The article 
295-C of Pakistan’s 1973 constitution 
says that ‘Whoever by words, either 
spoken or written, or by visible 
representation or by any imputation, 
innuendo, or insinuation, directly or 
indirectly, defiles the sacred name of 
the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace 
be upon him) shall be punished with 
death, or imprisonment for life, and 
shall also be liable to fine’.17 
In Pakistan, while Blasphemy has 
always been interpreted as a criminal 
act, by terming even ‘insinuation’ 
an act punishable by death, the law 
virtually opened the flood gates of 
violence, mainly against Minority 
Muslim and non-Muslim groups. 
Moreover, the issue of blasphemy 
that was forced into the language of 
the 1973 constitution by religious 
hardliners belonging to the Sunni 
sect of Islam, not only further 
ascertained religious majoritarianism 
in Pakistan but also commenced a 
process of radicalization which has 
since remained at the forefront of 
right-wing endeavors that continue 
to enable militant evangelists and 
encourage religious hatred in the 
country. As Rajan notes that ‘The 
numerical dominance of Sunni 
Muslims in Pakistan soon engendered 
Sunni hegemony in nationalist 
discourse…The hegemony of Sunni 
Islam fostered a definition of Islam 
in Pakistan that privileged orthodox 
Sunni ideologies’.18 
Since the codification of the law, 
more than 2000 cases have been 
registered under the Blasphemy 
law.19 As far as the nature of the 
charges is concerned, observers argue 
that a majority of the accusations 
are motivated by personal disputes. 
Mainly three types of blasphemy 
rights issue, positioning the state 
as another antagonist instead of 
the protector and guarantor of life’, 
argues Brohi.22 
Deploying religion for politics: 
Pandering to Islamists 
While the first two decades of 
Pakistan’s independence were ruled 
by political leaders who were liberal 
and progressive in outlook, they all 
buckled under the pressure of the 
country’s fundamentalist clergy 
either to safeguard their own regimes 
or to undermine the efforts of their 
political rivals.23 
In 1974, Zulfiaqar Ali Bhutto in order 
to gain support and sympathies of 
Islamists amended the country’s 
constitution to declare Muslim 
Ahmadya community as Non-
Muslims. Eventually, Zia ul Haq to 
further broaden his conservative 
support base, made it illegal 
for Ahmadis to call themselves 
Muslims.24 The blasphemy law was 
passed through parliament under 
Zia’s miltiuar regime without 
any broad debate or developing 
consensus among religious scholars 
of different Islamic sects. None of 
Zia’s successive governments have 
seriously tried to tackle the issue of 
blasphemy. During the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, political parties in 
Pakistan patronized Islamists for 
political gains. Particularly, during 
the last three decades, Pakistan’s 
ruling elite has openly offered 
orthodox Sunnis more legitimate 
claims on the state then other Islamic 
sects. Islamists on their part have 
used their extended influence and 
close connection between Islam and 
Pakistani citizenship as a source of 
ideological legitimacy to lobby for 
laws and constitutional amendments 
which have gradually marginalized 
minority Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities. 
Even the credibility and legitimacy of 
politicians and persons on decision 
making positions is measured on 
the basis of the brand of Islam they 
practice or represent rather than 
the kinds of policies they hope to 
implement. As Tudor contends that 
‘The salience of religion in public life 
has steadily grown over time because 
political parties and military both 
turn to Islam as a means of bolstering 
their waning legitimacy’.25 
Arguably, even elected civilians lack 
ideological legitimacy due to their 
observance to liberal democratic 
principles, which the Islamists 
consider un-Islamic. Democratic 
regimes in Pakistan have continued 
to appease the Islamists ‘by 
enshrining Islamic provisions in the 
constitution and seeking from them 
appropriate Islamic terminology and 
its ideological metaphor for policy 
making purposes’.26 
Moreover, the military regimes in 
Pakistan have lacked popular and 
constitutional legitimacy and in 
order to stay in power it has actively 
placated ‘the Islamists to benefit from 
their ideological legitimacy, the best 
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cases have been registered ranging from mere accusations to settling scores 
and expressing one’s own faith.20 Extrajudicial killings in blasphemy cases 
have become increasingly common with more than 65 people being killed 
since 1990 while their cases were pending in courts. At least eight of these 
cases have occurred in the last few years alone with a lawyer shot dead over 
the issue of representing an accuse of blasphemy, a man killed inside prison, 
a Christian couple burned to death by an enraged mob and a student killed by 
his fellow classmates for allegedly committing blasphemy. 
One of the most shocking murders related to the issue of blasphemy took 
place in 2011 when Pakistan’s Punjab province Governor, Salman Taseer, was 
murdered by his own security guard, Mumtaz Qadri in Islamabad. Primarily, 
Taseer was assassinated for publically defending a Christian woman who was 
accused of committing blasphemy and asking for amendments to the law in 
order to prevent its misuse. Qadri and thousands of other hardliners justified 
Taseer’s killing on the basis that the latter had asked for the revision to the 
blasphemy law which amounts to committing an act of blasphemy itself.21 
Shortly after killing Taseer, Qadri was hailed as a hero by thousands of 
Pakistanis while hundreds of lawyers gathered in courts to take his case. 
In fact, the country’s courts were directly threatened by fundamentals and the 
judges hearing his case, feared for their lives. While Qadri was hanged in 2016, 
the court in its final verdict didn’t discuss the issue of Blasphemy and whether 
the law had been misused. Instead, the court justified its verdict on the basis 
that Qadri had been sentenced to death for taking law into his own hands. 
The law has left such a deep mark on the national consciousness regarding 
the role of Islam in the state’s identity formation that even if the law could 
somehow be changed, which appears a challenge, it would not stop lynchings, 
extrajudicial killings, discrimination against minorities and mob violence. 
‘People participating in mob violence are not trying to implement existing 
laws, nor does the state have such behavioral control over the people that 
overturning the law will halt mob lynching. What the law does is to allow 
the state to hide behind religio-legalities and prevent its framing as a human 
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“Qadri was hailed as a 
hero by thousands ...”
appeasing Islamists again to ensure 
their support for electoral and other 
reasons. Second, the country’s 
political elite continues to remain 
reluctant from using the state’s full 
power to clamp down on Islamist 
groups because of the perceived 
threat of a political backlash. 
Unfortunately, the government’s 
efforts to curtail Islamists public 
influence that limits the state’s 
actions and policies in a number 
of ways, remained short lived. The 
space which the state was able to 
gain from the Islamists due to the 
implementation of some polices 
under the NAP, such as putting 
efforts to initiate a process to build 
a progressive and liberal narrative of 
Islam, have been lost again. 
The current government in Pakistan 
has tried to introduce a number of 
liberal and progressive legislations 
which have been actively resisted by 
the Islamists. Clearly, the country 
remains plagued with ideological 
differences. The state’s policies 
of giving Islamists a central in 
all spheres of life have virtually 
transformed Islamist groups into 
powerful actors that have a large 
popular support base in the country 
which may challenge the state at will. 
Competing political interests in the 
country have, once again, forced 
political elites into courting Islamists 
for political and electoral gains. 
The government and opposition 
political parties and interest groups 
have openly held meetings with the 
leaders of various proscribed Islamist 
organizations in an effort to shore 
up their support for the next general 
elections which are scheduled to be 
held in June 2018. Moreover, a number 
of Islamist groups in the country 
have been trying to become part of 
the Pakistan’s political arena.29 
It’s likely that a coalition of Islamist 
parties may emerge before the next 
general elections to challenge the 
state’s overall counter terrorism 
policies and the political elite’s 
recent efforts to change a number 
of rigid laws that have marginalized 
the country’s minority communities. 
One proscribed militant organization 
called the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), 
recently registered a political party 
with the Election Commission of 
Pakistan. 
While the leader of the JuD remains 
under house arrest from last few 
months, the militant organization’s 
political and social wings remain 
active on the ground.30 The party 
recently took part in a by-election in 
Pakistan’s Punjab province despite’s 
the country’s interior ministry’s 
reservations that the party remains 
a security threat. To everyone’s 
surprise, the candidate who contested 
the election with the JuD’s active 
support was able to squeeze more 
than 5500 votes, leaving behind the 
candidate of the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP), which has ruled Pakistan 
thrice in the past. 
53
it can achieve in terms of gaining 
legitimacy’.27 
The government of President 
Pervez Musharraf in 2000 
attempted to make some 
amendments in the law but 
relentless opposition from Islamist 
parties forced him into abandoning 
any reforms.28 For more than a 
decade Pakistan has struggled to 
deal with its militancy problem as 
militancy and religious extremism 
have besieged the country. In 2014, 
the country launched a National 
Action Plan (NAP), a twenty point 
strategy to tackle militancy in the 
country, which also contained 
steps to tackle Islamist elements 
conservative and radical narratives 
including reducing their influence 
and mass public support. 
So far, the country has not been 
able to implement a single major 
strategic aspect of its broad 
counter terrorism plan designed to 
tackle the rapid rise of extremism 
in the country. For instance, one of 
the core aspects of the NAP was to 
ensure that all religious seminaries 
in the country go through a 
reformation process and are 
registered with the government. 
However, so far any efforts to 
achieve this objective have been 
thwarted by the country’s religious 
elite. This has happened due to two 
reasons. One, the political elite’s 
infighting have again divided them 
among themselves and all political 
parties in the country have been 
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“the country has 
not been able 
to implement 
a single major 
strategic aspect 
of its broad 
counter terrorism 
plan ...”
One of the primary concerns in this regard deals with political stakeholder’s 
apologetic and compromising attitudes toward Islamic groups in the country. 
These right-wing forces are not only deepening the country’s ideological 
divides by violently imposing their own brand of Islam but are also challenging 
the state’s writ every day by reversing any progressive and liberal legislations 
and attitudes. While the execution of Qadri, the killer of Taseer, was ordered 
by the military, the government in 2016 could not prevent handful of Islamists 
from entering the county’s capital to celebrate Qardi’s actions. Instead, the 
government gave in to the protesters demands of not introducing any changes 
to the blasphemy law. 
In a recently written article for the South Asian Voices, titled, Need for a 
grand counter narrative in Pakistan’s counter terrorism strategy, I argued that 
‘While radical groups cite the prevention of threats to religion and its defense 
as the main justification behind their use of violence, consolidated efforts 
by right-wing political factions to entrench conservatism in Pakistan have 
exacerbated these narratives. Hardliners in Pakistan often exploit Islam’s 
generally-accepted conservative outlook in their public communications, 
which usually draw hundreds, and sometimes even thousands, of people to 
the streets against the country’s ruling liberal elite’.31 
Is it possible to change the law?
The question of changing the law has increasingly become a complex and 
daunting task. Certainly any effort to change the law will lead to a serious 
confrontation between conservative Islamic forces and political elites. 
Moreover, for the country’s Islamist parties, keeping the blasphemy law 
intact offers protection and importance to their ideological legitimacy which 
they continue to tap to revive their flagging significance in electoral terms. 
However, the really alarming fact is that as of this moment there doesn’t 
appear to be an effort or willingness at the state level to take on the issue 
with seriousness. Moreover than anything, the worrying prospect is that in the 
coming years even if the law and violence which it engenders broad support to 
became untenable for the power elite, would they be able to amend it? 
One of the biggest challenges in terms of changing the Blasphemy law deals 
with countering the mass public support which exists in the form of public 
support for the law which Islamists groups in the country continue to exploit 
to undermine the state’s efforts to amend it. How does the state convince 
hundreds of thousands of people that amending the law do not harm Islam’s 
image in any way? How does the state ensure that the country’s minority 
groups are not targeted under the guise of this law when anything under the 
guise of the law is considered a sacred act itself? Amending the law would 
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mean going against the masses 
demands and wishes which can also 
trigger a major conflict in the country 
with the state taking on its citizens. 
While expressing her concerns 
regarding the challenge of revising 
the law, Brohi argues that ‘By the 
time Pakistan decides to take up the 
challenge of amending the law it may 
be too late to address the one issue 
the state cannot control at will: there 
are people who can be roused into 
killing their neighbors, colleagues, 
friends, relatives’.32 
Conclusion
In essence, a legislation that was 
passed to protect Muslim sentiments 
became a weapon of revenge and 
violence in the hands of Islamists 
to eliminate free speech, social, 
religious and political differences in 
the name of Islam. The mere presence 
of the law, regardless of its contours, 
is discriminatory in nature, for it only 
talks about the protection of Islamic 
values while neglecting other beliefs. 
Moreover, a national identity ‘bound 
up with an exclusive Sunni Islam is 
also problematic because it propels 
growing levels of political violence’.33 
Pakistan faces the dilemma of having 
a constitution that patronizes a 
particular sect of Muslim population 
that happens to be in majority while 
undermines diversity, free speech, 
tolerance, progression and liberal 
values which in process divides 
the masses along ideological lines. 
Religious fanaticism and militarism 
in Pakistan have deepened to an 
extent that in the country’s collective 
imagination, blasphemy is considered 
a crime that is an unpardonable 
offense and anyone who challenges it 
should also pay with their life. 
Pakistani ruling elite’s use of Islam 
as a political tool has nourished 
religious revivalism with Islamist 
groups justifying their militaristic 
values in the name of personal faith. 
Unless the state takes control of the 
ideological fronts that are dominated 
by Islamists in the country and 
replace it with a tolerant, diverse 
and progressive narrative of Islam, 
Pakistan’s blasphemy law and its 
devastating impacts are here to 
stay. If Pakistan is to change the 
Blasphemy law and take on the 
Islamists mass public appeal, the 
country will have to clamp down on 
Islamist forces which continue to 
undermine religious diversity and 
liberal values in Pakistan. 
Any such situation will only 
materialize when all aspects of the 
Islamist group’s support base are 
isolated in the country. The first 
most critical step to achieve any such 
outcome will only take place when 
the country redefines the role of 
Islam and citizenship in the country’s 
imagination as a state. The state needs 
to introduce a version of Islam in its 
national narrative that emphasizes 
on respecting and accepting all sorts 
of religious diversity in the country 
rather than just one strand of Islam 
which the country’s majority of 
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population practices. Moreover, to purge the ideologies that continue to drive 
support for militant groups in Pakistan, the state needs to take control of the 
ideological frontiers of the country. The state needs to work on introducing a 
liberal and tolerant face of Islam. 
The future of the Blasphemy law in Pakistan is directly linked with the 
question of how effectively the state reverses the deep rooted Islamization 
of the county. Unless the support base of Islamists in Pakistan is countered 
with an alternative nationalist Islamic version which can truly bring together 
the whole country, Pakistan’s ideological polarization is expected to deepen 
and Islamist groups will continue to dominate Pakistan’s ideological, cultural, 
social and political frontiers. 
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